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ABSTRACT: I briefly present empirical findings suggesting that citizens in contemporary democracies face great 
difficulties in arriving at an accurate picture of the world and of the relevant policy options and in identifying 
trustworthy sources of information. Unfortunately, these difficulties do not seem to diminish with more education 
or with more effort and attention. I argue that a highly polluted information environment can defeat the sorts of 
strategies generally recommended to individuals under the label 'critical thinking.’ Finally, I consider what sort of 
institutional or systemic conditions would be necessary to provide citizens with a manageable epistemic task.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Citizens need to know something, on even the most minimal view of their role in a democratic 
society. Some would hold, ambitiously, that they ought to know enough to participate 
meaningfully in self-government. Others would say that it is enough if they can learn that the 
elites they have been passively allowing to rule (by voting or not voting) are no longer serving 
them well enough and it is time to 'throw the bums out'. Even this last minimal view, though, 
requires citizens to know when their interests are no longer being served and to know whether 
voting for an opposition party is more likely than not to improve the situation. And these things 
may not be so easy to know. 
 In this paper I briefly present findings from public opinion research, political 
psychology and media studies, suggesting that time-constrained citizens in contemporary 
democracies face great difficulties in arriving at even a minimally accurate picture of the world 
and of the relevant policy options. The problem is not just ignorance of the kind well 
documented by decades of political science research (the 'low-information voter'). There is also 
widespread misinformation and apparent immunity to disconfirming evidence. Unfortunately, 
these difficulties do not seem to diminish with more education or with more effort and 
attention. Given the presence in all of us of various cognitive biases, and of the processes 
lumped together under the label “motivated reasoning,” and given the generally 'polluted' 
character of our information environment, even diligent efforts to inform ourselves are all-too-
likely to entrench our prejudices instead of improving the accuracy of our beliefs. Public 
skepticism about climate science provides a case in point. 
  I argue that unfavorable epistemic conditions (a highly polluted information 
environment) can defeat the sorts of strategies generally recommended to individuals under 
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thelabel 'critical thinking,' at least when combined with plausible time and resource constraints 
and a realistic picture of human cognition. Finally, I consider what sort of changes in the 
information environment would be necessary to provide citizens with a manageable epistemic 
task.  
2. GROUNDS FOR PESSIMISM (DEMAND SIDE) 
I will not provide the standard rehearsal of voter ignorance. Suffice it to say, with Bartels 
(1996) that “The political ignorance of the American voter is one of the best-documented 
features of contemporary politics ….” Nor is there space here for a rehearsal of the debates 
over the significance of this ignorance—whether it is seriously disabling or whether most 
voters manage to make decisions that are ‘good enough’ despite it. I will just say that I am 
persuaded by writers like Bartels and Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) that American voters are 
uninformed and misinformed to an extent that is consequential in a very clear sense: Election 
results would be different if voters were better informed. 
 My main thesis: In the current epistemic environment, no feasible improvement in the 
information-seeking efforts of individual citizens is going to enable them to acquire the needed 
knowledge; to improve the level of public knowledge we will need to improve that 
environment. “Feasible” here refers not to the reluctance of many citizens to engage with 
politics or to seek out political information. What I mean is that even those who are willing to 
put a considerable amount of time and energy into investigating candidates and policy issues 
will find themselves thwarted. Why? 
 First, “considerable” does not, of course, mean “infinite.” None of us has time to learn 
all that might be useful or relevant, and more time devoted to one issue means less to others. 
While anyone can learn the rudiments of political processes, parties, and ideologies (and 
thereby become better-informed than most American voters), many issues of public policy are 
complex and controverted and could absorb nearly unlimited investigative resources. To 
become even moderately well-informed on more than a few such issues is impossible. And 
what might be possible for a person with a good deal of leisure will not be possible for most 
citizens, who have relatively little time left over after work and family responsibilities are 
discharged. Inevitably most people will have to rely almost entirely on others (experts and 
intermediaries) to provide the needed information and analysis in a form that can be 
assimilated within the available time. And even policy experts will have to rely on others for 
everything outside their area of expertise. (Some of the consequences of this reliance will be 
crucial to my argument below.) 
 Further, more education and paying more attention to the news media don’t always 
seem to help. The data here are not as robust, but we do have examples like: 
(1) College-educated Republicans are more likely than less-educated Republicans 
to be global warming skeptics (Pew polls, 2008, 2010). While less-educated 
and less-informed Americans do not display much partisan polarization on this 
issue, more educated and better-informed Americans do. One might hope that 
higher education would provide better tools and more background information, 
so that, whatever the truth of the matter, more educated people would be more 
likely to converge on it. Not so. 
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(2)  For most broadcast media sources, people who watched or listened more 
frequently were more likely to believe one or more false things about the Iraq 
war of 2003 (That Saddam Hussein’s regime had ‘weapons of mass 
destruction.’ That most experts said he did. That Iraq materially supported Al 
Qaeda. That world public opinion favored the US invasion.) (Kull, et al., PIPA 
poll, 2003). 
(3) Friedman (2005), citing Converse (1964): “Converse’s most disturbing and 
under-remarked finding is that the relatively well informed compensate in 
dogmatism for their greater knowledgeability" (p. xxii). 
Dogmatism may not be the best name for the underlying processes here. One psychological 
mechanism that may be at work is so-called “belief polarization.”1 This has recently received a 
careful philosophical analysis by Thomas Kelly (2008). Kelly starts with an empirical finding: 
Two people, who hold opposite views on a policy issue, can look at the same (mixed) body of 
evidence, and each come away thinking that their view is better supported by that evidence 
than the other’s is. On the face of it, this is bad from an epistemic point of view, but what 
seems to be going on here is not simple dogmatism. Each is not simply dismissing the evidence 
that counts against her view and latching on to the evidence that supports it. Instead she is 
looking at the disconfirming evidence very carefully—so carefully that she finds good reasons 
to discount it (methodological flaws in studies, alternative explanations of unwelcome data). 
And Kelly suggests that it is not unreasonable to look harder at disconfirming evidence. He 
compares this to scientists who try harder to find explanations of anomalies than of phenomena 
that fit easily into existing theory. Given scarcity of investigative resources, this seems like a 
reasonable strategy. Moreover, he says, people pursuing this strategy are not violating the 
Principle of the Commutivity of Evidence (the anti-path-dependence principle, which says that 
the order in which you get various bits of evidence shouldn’t matter to your epistemic 
evaluations). They are, instead, arriving at different bodies of evidence (because my total 
evidence includes, for example, the methodological flaws I have noticed in the studies I have 
subjected to stricter scrutiny.) My body of evidence is, in fact, biased by this process, but my 
assessment of the upshot of that evidence is not. So, Kelly concludes, as long as I am unaware 
of this biasing process, I still count as a reasonable inquirer. When I become aware of this 
process (as you and I, dear reader, are now aware) then I ought to take account of the fact that 
my evidence is likely to constitute a biased sample. But the typical case (and the one relevant 
to my point here) is the case where the subject is unaware of the bias. This is bias, but it is not 
dogmatism, and it exemplifies a pattern that has other instances: apparently conscientious 
reasoning that leads nonetheless to epistemically poor results. 
 This phenomenon shades off into other sorts of cognitive bias and ‘motivated 
reasoning’. The literature on these subjects is vast. Here I will attempt only the briefest of 
summaries.2 “Motivated reasoning refers to the unconscious tendency of individuals to process 
information in a manner that suits some end or goal extrinsic to the formation of accurate 
beliefs” (Kahan, 2011, p. 18). These goals can be various, but they are all non-epistemic. That 
is, they are not plausibly related to the goal of discovering the truth whatever it may be. Rather 
they serve other psychological needs: for self-affirmation, for a sense of group belonging, for 
                                                
1  The locus classicus is a study by Lord, Ross and Lepper (1979). In their terms ‘biased assimilation’ leads to 
‘attitude polarization’.  
2  This summary follows Kahan’s (2011) summary where a comprehensive set of references may be found. 
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status, for security, etc.—or simple material self-interest. Beliefs can be an important part of 
social identity and change of belief can disturb important relationships. (Kahan speaks in this 
connection of “identity-protective cognition.”) Whatever the goal, the distorting processes 
include biased search (where information is sought selectively to bolster one’s beliefs), biased 
assimilation (where information and arguments are selectively filtered and evaluated) and 
biased assignments of credibility to sources of testimonial evidence (often on the basis of 
group membership).  
 One consequence of these processes is that partisan identification often trumps facts 
and issue-consistency. People who identify strongly with a particular political party tend to 
skew their beliefs about quite objective aspects of the economy depending on which party is in 
power (Achen & Bartels, 2006). They tend to believe, for example, that the unemployment rate 
or the budget deficit or the rate of inflation are lower (or are falling) when ‘their side’ is in 
charge and are higher (or rising) when the other side is in charge. Moreover, partisans will 
‘agree’ with a policy position (more or less regardless of content) if they are told that it is the 
position of their party (Cohen, 2003). (Part of the picture here is that people will work hard to 
think of a reason why their party would be supporting an apparently discrepant policy 
position.) 
 Crucially, these processes go on below the level of conscious awareness. They are 
almost entirely unavailable to and denied by the subjects. Consequently, people tend to be far 
more aware of other people’s biases than of their own, and to interpret disagreement in 
pejorative terms, asking about partisans on the other side “Are they stupid or are they evil?” 
since it seems incomprehensible that an intelligent, well-motivated person could fail to see 
such obvious truths. (Kahan uses the term “naïve realism” to refer to this phenomenon.) 
 Can people be taught to do better than this, to become ‘critical thinkers’? It would be 
nice to think so, but there are reasons to doubt it. Philosophers (and others) who teach critical 
thinking often recommend a set of strategies of inquiry and evaluation like: consider the 
arguments on both sides of the question, look for fallacious reasoning and for inductively weak 
arguments, try to decide which side has the best case. Sometimes this can be effective, but, 
when the issues are complex and the assessment of evidence requires domain-specific 
expertise, it is not. As Neil Levy (2006) puts it, reading a book like Bjorn Lomborg’s The 
Skeptical Environmentalist is more likely to degrade your epistemic condition than to improve 
it. Why? Because it contains a large number of superficially plausible arguments which one is 
in no position to adequately assess (since one lacks the relevant expertise). 
 Nor should we expect that our determination to think critically and our use of the 
usual techniques will eliminate motivated reasoning. “Indeed, far from being immune from 
identity-protective cognition, individuals who display a greater disposition to use reflective and 
deliberative (so-called “System 2”) forms of reasoning rather than intuitive, affective ones 
(“System 1”) can be expected to be even more adept at using technical information and 
complex analysis to bolster group-congenial beliefs” (Kahan, 2011, pp. 20–21). As Hilary 
Kornblith argues in “Distrusting Reason” (1999), a rather plausible case can be made for 
regarding a great deal of apparently sincere and conscientious reasoning as no more than 
rationalization. Here, intelligence and reasoning skills work against us, by making our 
rationalizations more plausible to ourselves and to others. Achen and Bartels (2006, p. 44) 
write, “Most of the time, the voters are merely reaffirming their partisan and group identities at 
the polls. They do not reason very much or very often. What they do is rationalize. Every 
election, they sound as though they were thinking, and they feel as if they were thinking, as do 
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we all. The unwary scholarly devotee of democratic romanticism is thereby easily misled.” 
Finally, Kahan (2011, p. 22) reports findings that suggest that exhortations to be objective, to 
approach issues in a spirit of open-mindedness, and to set aside biases, tend to backfire by 
triggering the very group identifications one was hoping to defuse. When the issue of bias is 
put on the table, so to speak, defending the beliefs characteristic of one’s group becomes a 
matter of honor. 
3. GROUNDS FOR PESSIMISM (SUPPLY SIDE) 
So far I have been describing difficulties that seem to arise from human psychology. But we 
also have a highly ‘polluted’ information environment. Politicians and their advocates lie and 
spread misinformation. Industry sponsored think tanks and institutes, following a playbook 
initiated by the tobacco industry, try to sow doubt and confusion about, for example, the health 
effects of formaldehyde or the effects of CFC’s on the ozone layer (Jackall, 1988). More 
recently global warming has received a similar treatment (Oreskes & Conway, 2010; 
Anderson, 2011). Chain emails spread fabricated or misinterpreted stories. “Push polls” offer 
tendentious characterizations of issues and candidates in the guise of attempts to measure 
public opinions. Employers provide distorted information to employees about public affairs 
and legislation, urging them to contact their elected officials. And, of course, the media 
environment is saturated with advertising.  
 It would be possible for the press as an institution to help citizens sort through the 
smoke and the spin, and news organizations often claim to be aiming to play that role. (Even 
Bill O’Reilly of Fox News, who strikes many observers as a fairly crude purveyor of 
conservative propaganda, claims to be providing a “no spin zone,” in which politicians are held 
accountable to the public.) But, like many observers, I see a press that is serving the public 
rather poorly (Fallows, 1996). For one thing we have a set of media organizations that seem 
highly partisan (Fox News, the Murdoch-owned press more generally, right wing talk radio). 
For another, television has adopted an entertainment-focused model in which TV news shows 
are full of people talking very briefly, emphatically and unreliably about complex issues 
(evidently on the principle that controversy is more attractive to viewers than content).  
 But even in the more serious and ‘responsible’ quarters of the news business, all is not 
well. There are a number of unhelpful norms of journalistic practice. There is the often 
lamented (but never abandoned) emphasis on ‘horse race reporting,’ where the focus is on how 
statements and decisions will affect the political standing of officials with various groups (or 
their electoral fortunes), not on the truth of the statements or the effectiveness (much less the 
wisdom) of the decisions/policies. A closely related tendency is the conflation of perceptions 
and reality, where the fact that a certain action or policy will be seen in a particular way by 
some audience is more salient than whether or not that perception is accurate. 3 
 But I want to focus mainly on the way that news organizations transmit and mediate 
the views of experts. There are two standard and contradictory practices, neither of them 
helpful. 
                                                
3  An example: “Obama owns the economy” – no distinction is drawn between causal responsibility (his policies 
have made the economy worse) and political perception (voters will blame the President for the bad economy 
regardless of why it is bad).  
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 1) In the first sort of case, journalists transmit the claims and judgments of experts and 
authorities to the public, without comment and without much attention to dissenting views. 
This seems to have been the case in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq by the US and its allies 
in 2003. The media did not provide much resistance to the Bush administration's effort to 'sell' 
the invasion of Iraq to the American public in 2002–2003. The case for war was made to the 
American people and to the world with a lot of very scary claims about the 'gathering danger' 
of Iraq—including the possibility that Saddam Hussein would give a nuclear weapon to 
terrorists who would use it to blow up an American city. As we subsequently learned,4 the 
evidence for most of their claims was much shakier than they led us to believe. And for the 
most part the US media simply relayed these claims to the American people, without much 
analysis and certainly without giving anywhere near the same kind of prominence to the views 
of people (many of whom had excellent credentials) who had a different view of the nature of 
the Iraqi threat and what would be the best way to deal with it. 
 As reporter Karen DeYoung put it: "We are inevitably the mouthpiece for whatever 
administration is in power. If the president stands up and says something, we report what the 
president said" (Kurtz, 2004). And if contrary arguments are put "in the eighth paragraph, 
where they're not on the front page, a lot of people don't read that far" (Kurtz, 2004). 
 The result is that even our best newspapers provide reasonably accurate coverage of 
important issues—at best—only to careful and diligent readers. Even the most casual reader 
learned from front-page headlines that the Bush administration repeatedly claimed that Iraq 
had WMD's and ties to al Qaeda. Only a reader who read to the end of the articles and searched 
the back pages for more could discover that many intelligence experts in and out of the 
government thought that the evidence for those claims was weak. This suggests that the key to 
helpful journalism is to make sure that reporting is 'fair and balanced' and gives equal time and 
equal prominence to opposing views. But my second example cuts the other way. 
 2) Media coverage of the global warming issue often conforms to a norm of ‘balance.’ 
But several researchers have found that this norm is, in this case, doing more to damage public 
understanding than to improve it. There is growing recognition that the norm of ‘balance’ as 
currently understood degenerates too easily into a practice of ‘balance as bias’ or ‘he said-she 
said’ journalism, leaving news consumers confused rather than enlightened. The problem is 
that readers (or viewers) who are presented with reports of scientific assessments of the nature 
and significance of global warming and who are then presented with a skeptical or critical 
response are left with the impression that these views are of roughly equal plausibility, that 
there is no consensus among the experts. (See Anderson, 2011, for discussion of the research 
on this point.) Declining public concern about global warming and declining willingness to 
endorse remedial measures seems to have been produced (in part) by this pattern of coverage. 
 But now it seems as though journalists are damned if they do (present “both sides of 
the story”) and damned if they don’t (by foregrounding the views they find most plausible at 
the time and ignoring the critics). The consumers of the news are poorly informed in either 
case. I will try to say something about how to resolve this dilemma in the final section of this 
paper. 
 
                                                
4  http://msnbc.msn.com/id/5403731/ -- Senate Intelligence Committee report on pre-war intelligence failures in 
Iraq 
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4. EPISTEMIC DEPENDENCE AND UNAVOIDABLE BUT UNFORTUNATE TRUST 
I said above that we will inevitably rely on others for most of what we can claim to know. This 
is an instance of what Allen Buchanan (2004) calls “epistemic dependence.” Unavoidably, we 
will trust those who nurture us as children. They and others in our immediate social 
environment will (partly) set the starting conditions for all of our epistemic evaluations. What 
we can know and what we will fail to know will be affected drastically by those starting 
conditions and then by contingent facts about the other influences that come our way.  
 Some examples: 
Example 1: Allen Buchanan on growing up racist:  
I grew up in the American South during the 1950s and 1960s in a racist family culture embedded in 
a society of institutionalized racism. … I was taught, by explicit dogma and by example, to regard 
blacks as subhuman. Unlike my mother, I never witnessed a lynching, but I did once see a 
desiccated, severed black ear of unknown provenance, proudly displayed by a white junior high 
school classmate. I also recall joking with my friends about the "Tucker telephone," a crank-
operated dynamo that was used to deliver electrical shocks to the genitals of black inmates of a 
nearby penal farm. Largely through luck, I left this toxic social environment at the age of eighteen 
and came to understand that the racist world view that had been inculcated in me was built on a web 
of false beliefs about natural differences between blacks and whites. My first reaction was a bitter 
sense of betrayal: Those I had trusted and looked up to—my parents, aunts and uncles, pastor, 
teachers, and local government officials—had been sources of dangerous error, not truth. (Buchanan 
2004) 
Buchanan also claims that he was taught strategies for evading evidence that might have 
undermined his racist beliefs. Buchanan goes on to argue that the cultural and institutional 
features of liberal democracy offer our best protection against the possibility that our starting 
point is so deficient—by drawing us into exchanges with diverse others in a context where 
there is a presumption of epistemic equality. But what would have happened if he had stayed in 
his community of origin? 
Example 2: Baurmann on “Rational Fundamentalism”  
 Baurmann’s argument (2007) is too complex to summarize here, but the intuitive idea 
is fairly simple: given the right kind of social environment it is (at least subjectively) rational to 
become and remain a fundamentalist. A fundamentalist is defined as someone who prioritizes 
salvation over worldly goods, regards his belief system as certain and not appropriately subject 
to doubt or criticism, and who divides the world into the good (who can be trusted) and the evil 
(who should be avoided, if not killed). 
  Two elements of Baurmann’s account are especially relevant to this paper: 
(1) Particularistic trust. The rule is: “distrust everyone who is not a member of 
your group.” When one is the member of a relatively isolated social group that 
is in hostile and/or conflict-ridden relationships with surrounding groups one 
will get enough confirmation of the untrustworthiness of members of other 
groups (they will treat one badly in various ways) that it is (again, 
subjectively) rational to continue to follow this rule (supposing it has been 
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taught to one by those in one’s “personal trust network”—those one has come 
to trust on the basis of close personal relationships).  
(2) Epistemic seclusion. This is accomplished by the inculcation of norms 
granting epistemic authority to group leaders and sacred texts and by, as much 
as possible, keeping group members away from contact with alternative 
sources of information (e.g., home schooling, ostracism and expulsion of 
dissenters, forbidding dangerous literature). Particularistic trust helps here, too. 
 Again, the idea is that in this kind of environment it is subjectively rational for an 
individual to adopt and maintain a fundamentalist set of beliefs and norms. Baurmann, like 
Buchanan, emphasizes the fact that those of us who are in a more open-ended and 
‘enlightened’ social environment, where we can extend our trust to the deliverances of science, 
are (epistemically) lucky, not particularly rational. The superior (objective) rationality “lies in 
the institutions of science and the culture of an open and liberal society and not in the 
individual rationality of the single citizen.” 
 Backing off a bit from the totalistic nature of the fundamentalist belief system and its 
social epistemology, we arrive at: 
Example 3: Distrusting Climate Science. 
 We can think of this as a less drastic version of the previous example. (At least, it’s 
less drastic for the ‘climate change deniers’ who are not fundamentalists.) The social and 
epistemic isolation is not as complete and the beliefs are not as extreme. But there is still a 
version of ‘particularistic trust’. One is provided with reasons for disregarding the testimony of 
scientists, academics, and mainstream journalism. One is persuaded that only Fox can be 
trusted to give you accurate news reports. Everyone else is said to suffer from liberal bias, anti-
Americanism, hostility to markets and to business, moral relativism and other epistemically- 
disabling conditions. Climate scientists, in particular, cannot be trusted because they have a 
strong conflict of interest: they want more money for their research, which will only come to 
them if they alarm the public and thus make it seem that their research is particularly urgent. In 
this way the denier is inoculated against conflicting evidence. And there is enough hostility, 
contempt and condescension coming from liberals and scientifically-minded people that the 
attitude of particularistic trust gets the support it needs. 
 Examples such as these seem to me to illustrate with particular force the dependence 
of the individual citizen on his or her epistemic environment. If we know better than the people 
described in these examples, then we are lucky. 
5. MELIORATIVE STRATEGIES 
After all this pessimism I wish I had a more persuasive (and less familiar) set of remedies. I do 
not. And though my main thesis is that we need to adjust our epistemic environment instead of 
expecting individuals to rise above it, I have no reason to think that the sorts of reforms 
suggested here (and by other like-minded scholars) have much chance of coming to pass. It 
might be just as reasonable to hope for a reform of human nature. Nonetheless … 
Journalism: 
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 We need more effort to identify and give pride of place to genuine experts rather than 
flacks, politicians, generic commentators (Brooks & Shields) and horse-race handicappers. We, 
therefore, need reporters to develop the subject-area knowledge necessary to be reliable guides 
to who the experts are, what the state of scientific (and other expert) understanding is, and who 
is likely to be telling us the truth.  We need serious efforts to assess the truth of statements 
by public officials and others who attempt to shape the public’s understanding. (We need more 
than the sort of quick and perfunctory ‘fact-checking’ that is so widely practiced. This latter is 
better than nothing, but only if it employs reasonable standards of evidence. All too often, it 
does not, as a desire to appear even-handed leads to a refusal to decide which party to a dispute 
has the better case, and to sometimes-strained efforts to find all parties guilty of something. ) 
This requires (again) more expertise on the part of the journalists, but also a different 
conception of their role: as fact-finders, not opinion conveyers (Cunningham, 2003.) To play 
this role, however, more is needed than better-educated and differently-oriented journalists. As 
noted above, the rationality of science lies in its institutions and practices more than in the 
virtues of individual scientists. Analogously, journalism cannot rely on the integrity and 
diligence of individual journalists. It needs some analogue of the institutions of peer review 
and scholarly debate. 
Education: 
 We need to inculcate scientific and critical habits of mind. Every high school graduate 
should know enough about the nature of scientific inquiry and the practices and institutions of 
science to be an intelligent consumer of scientific reports and to have some idea about how to 
identify real expertise.  
 Media literacy (and now Web literacy) should be goals of instruction. This would 
include some awareness of the way journalistic practices (and search engine algorithms) can let 
us down.  
 We need to put less emphasis on argument analysis and evaluation and more emphasis 
on raising consciousness about cognitive and motivational biases. This flies in the face of my 
own training (as an analytic philosopher), but ironically, it seems to be where the best 
arguments and evidence lead us. However, there is considerable work left to do before we have 
a good set of tools for ‘de-biasing’. As noted above, it does not seem to be effective to simply 
make people aware of these biasing processes and then exhort them to do better. Indeed, we 
have good reason to suspect that people will deploy their knowledge about cognitive and 
motivational biases in a biased way. What would seem to be required are procedures that will 
take these biases out of play. But such procedures may not exist for the sorts of knowledge we 
are worried about in connection with democratic politics.5  
 None of this can work unless the general cultural prerequisites are present: as they are 
not when religious leaders succeed in de-legitimating all non-religious sources of knowledge, 
or when conservative ‘thought-leaders’ teach their followers not to trust academia, the 
mainstream media, or the institutions of mainstream science. So we need to find way to draw 
the epistemically segregated and mutually suspicious elements of our society into productive 
                                                
5  Consider an analogy: It is apparently futile to exhort people who are auditioning prospective orchestra players 
to be fair with respect to gender. If the evaluators are aware of the gender of the players, then their perception 
of the quality of the playing will be affected (to the detriment of female applicants). It is however possible and 
effective to put the auditioning players behind a screen, so that the evaluators cannot see them and are forced 
to judge purely on the basis of what they can hear. What sorts of procedures could do this kind of job in the 
realm of politics? 
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dialogue. Here there are some reasons to be hopeful. Hugo Mercier and Helen Landemore 
(Landemore & Mercier 2010, Mercier & Landemore 2012) have argued that the problems of 
motivated reasoning and cognitive biases are most acute for solitary reasoners, and that they 
can be overcome when people reason together in a properly deliberative way. Building on 
Mercier’s argumentative theory of reasoning, which suggests that the evolutionary basis for 
reasoning is in competitive social interaction and not in truth-seeking,6 they argue that people 
who exchange arguments can compensate for each other’s cognitive and motivational biases. 
Solitary reasoners are likely to construct arguments supporting their pre-existing views, and 
they are not likely to subject those arguments to rigorous scrutiny. But two or more people 
reasoning together can check each other and thereby do better. What is necessary for this 
process to go well, according to Landemore and Mercier, is at least some degree of cognitive 
diversity among the participants (they cannot be too ‘like-minded’) and they must actually 
argue in an adversarial way, putting forward arguments for their views and subjecting the 
arguments of others to critical scrutiny.  
 Alas, I must end on a note of caution. A problem with the appeal to the idea of 
deliberative exchange is that, in the real world, there is no guarantee that any formal rules or 
procedures will prevent the subtler forms of interpersonal power from corrupting the process. 
"Discussion is repression" ran a slogan of the German student movement in 1968. The students 
had a point. Anne Phillips' account of the drawbacks of participatory democracy in the 
women's movement illustrates the problem (1991, pp. 120–146). In-face-to-face meetings, the 
emotional relationships of the participants become crucial. Phillips reports many women 
feeling afraid to voice disagreement, informal and unaccountable patterns of leadership, and 
the emergence of false consensus. I think these are real problems, and I see no possibility of an 
easy or permanent solution. It is possible to stipulate ‘rules of engagement,’ like taking turns 
and making sure everyone has a chance to contribute to agenda-setting. But nothing of this sort 
can guarantee that people will not be shamed or seduced in one way or another. Neither the 
formal features of an ‘ideal speech situation’ nor any specifiable set of rules can substitute for 
the (uncodifiable) virtues required for good deliberation. 
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